As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual and (...) the possible either within a reason that fails to be resolute, or within a split soul that houses a play of forces. Reflection upon them alerts us to the elusiveness at once of mental reality, and of the understanding by which we hope to capture and transform it. Studying in turn the treatments of _Mental Conflict_ in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, A.W. Price demonstrates how the arguments of the Greeks are still relevant to philosophical discussion today. (shrink)

As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual and (...) the possible either within a reason that fails to be resolute, or within a split soul that houses a play of forces. Reflection upon them alerts us to the elusiveness at once of mental reality, and of the understanding by which we hope to capture and transform it. Studying in turn the treatments of _Mental Conflict_ in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, A.W. Price demonstrates how the arguments of the Greeks are still relevant to philosophical discussion today. (shrink)

Different ideals of friendship feed into different ideals of political community. A political liberal can accept that political association should be a form of friendship,so long as his conception of friendship is a liberal one. Plato hopes for maximal mutual identification, with lovers' lives merging, and citizens applying the term 'mine' together.What then leaves it a problem why philosophers should be willing to rule is that they cannot share the most valuable part of their life — doing philosophy — with (...) most of their fellow-citizens. Plato stills intends a degree of political and interpersonal unity that sounds amiable, but invites fascism. Aristotle takes over some of Plato's structure: friends' lives overlap in the activities they share; and all citizens are to belinked within political friendship. This appears to be a dilute form of perfect friendship, retaining goodwill, but replacing intimacy by acquaintance, and rather pursuing than presupposing similarity. To move from that to a liberal conception of friendship andpolitics we need to allow that friends and fellow-citizens may accept one another's choices without fully endorsing them. Personal affection and respect can and should survive a recognition even of fundamental differences — so long as these are compatible with the values of friendship. (shrink)

For over two thousand years thought about the infinite was dominated by Aristotelian hostility to the idea that the infinite could be a legitimate object of mathematical study. Then Cantor's work late in the nineteenth century seemed to overturn this orthodoxy. However, by highlighting ways in which infinitude still could not be brought under the control of mathematicians, Cantor's work may in fact have reinforced the orthodoxy.

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one (...) of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)

In one sense of the term current among analytical philosophers, the quietist_lacks skeptical doubts about the metaphysical or epistemological status of ethical judgments as a class of judgment. He may still have doubts about, say, the current state of morality. There are criteria of courage by which, though they are open-ended, a man may count as acting bravely. It need not follow that he has adopted the best tactics. Yet he must have responded fittingly to danger. But how is (...) that to be identified? “Ought”-judgments are to be understood contextually, with an implicit relativity to certain ends or quasi-ends, and—when the “ought” is only pro tanto—to certain aspects of, or opportunities within, a situation. These judgments are often intuitive in that they do not derive from the application of a principle. Fittingness is an anthropocentric relation that holds within some human perspective; we should not think of it as a feature purportedly inherent in the very nature of things. It is salutary to remember cases where the “ought” is so relativized, say to an undesirable end, that it identifies no reason for action. The nature of the relation does not change when it is relativized to an end that the agent has reason to achieve. “Ought”-judgments should not be interpreted in ambitious ways that make them generally problematic. (shrink)

This third edition of The Infinite includes a new part 'Infinity Superseded' which contains two new chapters refining Moore's ideas through a re-examination of the ideas of Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Much of this is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze. There is also a new technical appendix on still unresolved issues about different infinite sizes.

There is still something to be said about these figures for the Athenian hoplite force, the more so as the most reasonable discussion of them, Meyer's, is spoilt by some unsound inferences and has in consequence not found support. Their difficulty is apparent: a muster πανσημει in 338 meant calling up all classes up to the age of 50 , and since Socrates fought at Delion and Amphipolis when he was in his late forties, and not at Mantineia when (...) he was over 50, we may assume that it meant the same in the fifth century; we also assume that ‘the youngest’ are those in their nineteenth and twentieth years, as in the fourth century, certainly after the reform of the Ephebeia, perhaps earlier ; military service ceased at 60. But how could the number of men in these twelve classes, 19-20 and 51-60, stand in the proportion of 13: 17 to the men between 21 and 50 ? They could not be more than a third, and might be less. (Beloch, 1923, tries to make the problem more difficult by the arbitrary assumption that the 13,000 citizen hoplites are all the men of 21-60, instead of 21-50. Meyer, who accepts Thucydides’ figures, forgets that there must have been ‘oldest and youngest’ metics, besides the 3,000 who marched into Megara. Busolt and Meyer also argue that the classes 51-60 will have suffered specially heavy losses in the battles of 459-445, while the eight youngest classes would have seen no fighting. (shrink)

It is only two years since Immanuel Kant published his monumental Critique of Pure Reason.As part of entering into the spirit of this ‘untimely review’, I shall pretend that only the first edition of the Critique exists. This has a bearing on some claims that I shall make about differences between the content of the Prolegomena and that of the Critique. Despite its formidable difficulty, that book has already generated intense interest in the philosophical community. Those who are still (...) struggling to come to terms with its dense and subtle argumentation, or who may not even have started to read it yet but who know from the furore that it has created that it needs to be high on their ‘to read’ list, might easily despair at the prospect of having now to contend with another volume on the same broad range of subjects by the same author. This prospect is not, however, as daunting as it seems. In fact, it should afford some solace, at least if we are to believe claims that Kant makes on beh. (shrink)

In the U.S.A., advocates of academic freedom—the ability to pursue research unencumbered by government controls—have long found sparring partners in government officials who regulate technology trade. From concern over classified research in the 1950s, to the expansion of export controls to cover trade in information in the 1970s, to current debates over emerging technologies and global innovation, the academic community and the government have each sought opportunities to demarcate the sphere of their respective authority and autonomy and assert themselves in (...) that sphere. In this paper, we explore these opportunities, showing how the Social Contract for Science set the terms for the debate, and how the controversy turned to the proper interpretation of this compact. In particular, we analyze how the 1985 presidential directive excluding fundamental research from export controls created a boundary object that successfully demarcated science and the state, but only for a Cold War world that would soon come to an end. Significant changes have occurred since then in the governance structures of science and in the technical and political environment within which both universities and the state sit. Even though there have been significant and persistent calls for reassessing the Cold War demarcation, a new institutionalization of how to balance the concerns of national security and academic freedom is still only in its nascent stages. We explore the value of moving from a boundary object to a boundary organization, as represented in a proposed new governance body, the Science and Security Commission. (shrink)

Professor Webster's attempt to prove that south Italian vases of the middle of the fourth century can be used as evidence of Athenian theatrical arrangements of half or three-quarters of a century earlier leaves me unconvinced. It, is true that, as he says, ‘the plays’ which the vases illustrate ‘come from Athens'— at least, most of them probably did: but a number of scenes on the vases are not scenes presented in the plays at all, but are scenes suggested to (...) the painter by descriptions in messengers’ speeches, or, quite possibly, by the story dramatized in the plays, but not by the Athenian poet's particular treatment of the story; the plays —and the stories made popular by them—had been the common property of the Greek world for more than half a century, and there is no reason why Italian producers should have gone back to the original production in Athens, still less why Italian painters should have done so, even if they knew what the original production was like. (shrink)

W. Norris Clarke's metaphysics of the universe as a journey rests on six major positions: the unrestricted dynamism of the mind, the primacy of the act of existence, the participation structure of reality, and the person, considered as both the starting point of philosophy and the source of the categories needed for a flexible contemporary metaphysics. Reflecting on his conscious life and the universe around him, the finite person mounts by a two-fold path to its Infinite source, who, though immutable (...) in His natural being, is mutable in the intentional being of His personal knowledge and love. The personal God is the efficient cause from whom the universe comes and the final cause to whom it returns.Less optimistic than Norris Clarke, John Caputo wonders about his metaphysics of the person. In a hermeneutical interpretation of the human face, the person through whom Being "sounds" discloses an ambiguous Being that both reveals and conceals itself. Far from grounding a casual ascent to God, hermeneutical phenomenology allows us no more than the right to interpret the world and its transcendent source through our own free decision.Although impressed by Norris Clarke's attempt to introduce mutability into God, Lewis Ford still finds Clarke's Thomistic God unacceptable. As a Whiteheadian, he proposes in place of Thomas' God, whose perfection consists in static unity, a God whose perfection consists in a never-ending process of unification. John Smith argues against the traditional dichotomy made between the ontological and cosmological arguments. Rather than opposed methods of proving God's existence, they should be taken as complementary journeys to the divine presence which discloses itself, although diversely, in the soul and in the world. There are parallels between Smith's historical study of two arguments and Clarke's two-fold path to God. Yet Smith is critical of Thomas' cosmological journey to God and does not share Clarke's confidence in its validity. Significant studies in their own right, the three essays as a group challenge Clarke's whole metaphysics of the universe as a journey. Meeting the challenge, Clarke clarifies and refines his own thought.An account of Clarke's philosophy by Gerald A. McCool, S.J. preceds this unified and stimulating philosophical discussion. (shrink)

The foregoing, both appearing in early 2012, represent very different understandings about the significance of being substantially overweight and possible responses. The first focuses on being fat as the problem. 3 The solution is weight loss or, better still, prevention of weight gain. Of particular note is the plight of obese children and their physical ailments and psychological stress because of bullying by other children and embarrassment in wider society. The second underscores the enormous difficulty of losing weight and, (...) even more so, of maintaining any such reduction. Being fat may give rise to problems. But the greatest difficulty may be in not accepting that most people who become fat will remain fat. That denial stymies efforts to foster the healthiest state possible for the obese and to create effective prevention programs, especially for children. (shrink)

Introduction: The decision of “do not attempt resuscitation” in the event of cardiopulmonary arrest is usually made when the patients are critically ill and cannot make an informed choice. Although, various professional bodies have published guidelines, little is know about the patients’ own views regarding DNAR discussion.Aim: The aim of this study was to determine patients’ attitudes regarding discussing DNAR before they are critically ill.Methods: A prospective study was performed in a general out patients department. A questionnaire was distributed to (...) consecutive outpatients along with an explanatory leaflet in the adult outpatient clinic.Results: 364 patients completed the questionnaire . 90% of respondents wanted all patients to be asked regarding DNAR decision at some point during a hospital admission. The majority would not find a DNAR discussion distressing. Only 10% would find it upsetting, however, 48% of these still wanted a discussion. 37% of respondents wanted to discuss DNAR decisions on admission; 32% in outpatients; 17% at consent for surgery, 14% when they are critically ill. 87% of respondents would not object to their relatives being involved in making decisions about their resuscitation status. However, only 12% of the subjects in the study had been involved in discussing the resuscitation status of a relative and 21% would not be comfortable to discuss a relative’s resuscitation status. Although 33% of patients preferred their resuscitation status to simply be documented within their clinical notes, 77% wanted it to be more easily accessible.Conclusions: This study suggests that contrary to current practice most patients want to discuss their DNAR status prior to becoming critically ill. This includes half of the small number that find it distressing to discuss. Although most patients are comfortable with relatives being involved in discussing DNAR, a significant proportion do not want their relatives to be asked. Furthermore, once a decision has been made, the majority of patients want it to be more accessible than current practice allows. (shrink)

This monumental work by a perceptive medieval scholar is undoubtedly the most comprehensive work in any modern language of the overall system of Ockham. Its three parts deal respectively with the cognitive order, the theological order, and the created order. Leff credits the more than 30 years of research by such Ockham scholars as Hochstetter, Vignaux, Moody, Baudry, Boehner, etc., with correcting his own earlier misconception—shared by so many historians of philosophy and theology—of Ockham as the one who destroyed scholasticism (...) and upset the fine balance of faith and reason by his ruthless logic, religious insensitivity, and skepticism. Such misconceptions stem from viewing Ockham either through the eyes of his predecessors, such as Aquinas or Scotus, or in the light of "the Ockhamism" of those who claimed to be his followers. In the present book, the author eschews this type of "historical approach." As he puts it, "I have sought to see his thought as a whole, in its own terms, not in pedigrees or... subsequent effects." Although much of Ockham’s writing still await critical editing, Leff sees a remarkable unity in all his works. "They are shaped by the same principles which recur throughout Ockham’s writings.... Whatever the modifications still to come as his works are properly edited, it is inconceivable that they will alter the configuration of Ockham’s thought. It is founded upon the discrepancy between the conceptual and the ontological expressed in the contrast between the individual nature of all being and the universal nature of our concepts. Instead of assuming or attempting to establish a direct rapport between them, Ockham was the first thinker systematically to explore their difference whilst accepting their interdependence." It is precisely because of this interdependence that Ockham was a "conceptualistic realist," to use Boehner’s description. Ockham was "safeguarding concepts from the status of merely mental constructs." He did not deny them epistemological validity as the nominalists did. On the other hand the varying degrees of "realism"—other than conceptualistic—"allowed no means of distinguishing logically between the mental and the real.... The distinction between concepts and what they represented then vanishes, and with it the power of differentiating true from false propositions." Ockham was genuinely concerned with meaning and evidence, the two key words that Leff believes best characterize his outlook. Leff’s professed aim is to show that "Ockham was not a logician devaluing theology or metaphysics; he was no less a philosopher and theologian than his predecessors. He accepted the same framework of knowledge and belief. The difference was that he was concerned with their meaning and evidence to the exclusion of treating their concepts as metaphysical bricks from which to build systems." Howsoever much Leff may have succeeded in achieving this goal or how many of his interpretations of specific topics may need some modification, the fact that he has followed Ockham’s thinking and argument step by step—often in what seems to be little more than an English paraphrase of the Latin text—makes his own detailed analysis a useful instrument for anyone seriously interested in Ockham’s thought.—A.B.W. (shrink)

Fibring has been shown to be useful for combining logics endowed withtruth-functional semantics. However, the techniques used so far are unableto cope with fibring of logics endowed with non-truth-functional semanticsas, for example, paraconsistent logics. The first main contribution of thepaper is the development of a suitable abstract notion of logic, that mayalso encompass systems with non-truth-functional connectives, and wherefibring can still be dealt with. Furthermore, it is shown that thisextended notion of fibring preserves completeness under certain reasonableconditions. This completeness (...) transfer result, the second main contributionof the paper, generalizes the one established in Zanardo et al. (2001) butis obtained using new techniques that explore the properties of a suitablemeta-logic (conditional equational logic) where the (possibly)non-truth-functional valuations are specified. The modal paraconsistentlogic of da Costa and Carnielli (1988) is studied in the context of this novel notionof fibring and its completeness is so established. (shrink)

In September of 1965 G. H. von Wright discovered in Vienna a hitherto unknown notebook written in pencil by Wittgenstein. The first part contains an early, but essentially complete version of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Since it contains the dedication to David H. Pinsent who died May 8, 1918, von Wright dates its composition just before the final composition of the Tractatus in the summer of 1918. This is confirmed by the remaining portion of the manuscript which contains additions and further (...) elucidations to the Prototractatus plus a Preface, all of which are found, virtually unchanged, in the final version of the Tractatus. This edition contains a quite readable facsimile of the entire manuscript, an edition of the text of the Prototractatus that indicates its differences from the final text and a translation en regard by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. A lengthy introduction by von Wright on the publication history of the Tractatus and a concluding set of Tables indicating parallel passages between the Tractatus and Prototractatus as well as those portions of each work which have nothing corresponding in the other, complete the volume. In view of the fact that Wittgenstein on his last visit to Vienna before his death ordered that the several notebooks which still existed from the time of germination of the Tractatus be destroyed, one might ask just what contribution this expensive edition of the Prototractatus may be expected to make to our understanding of Wittgenstein's thought. Unlike the 1914-1916 Notebooks, which by some happy accident escaped the destruct order, the Prototractatus does not seem to differ in any significant substantive way from the final printed version. This is to be expected if von Wright's dating of the work is correct. Hence, while the historian of literature may be delighted with the present text, the student of philosophy may find it disappointing. What does make the present volume of value, however, is von Wright's historical introduction with its reproduction of many of Wittgenstein's letters to various prospective publishers. Of especial interest in this connection is Wittgenstein's illuminating comment to Ludwig von Ficker of Innsbruck, editor of Der Brenner, that "the book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which... will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts; the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book." This would seem to confirm Anscombe's interpretation of Tractatus 6.52 rather than Ayer's and that of the Vienna Circle.--A. B. W. (shrink)

For his contribution to the general series of Harper Essays in Philosophy, Hilary Putnam selects only one of several philosophical problems in the interrelated fields of logic and/or mathematics that have interested him, viz. the nominalism-realism issue: Are the "abstract entities" spoken of in these sciences, such as classes, number, functions from various kinds of things to real numbers, things that "really exist" or not? He is concerned to present a detailed argument for his own "qualified realism" rather than a (...) survey of current opinions. He argues persuasively that while a nominalist would like to eliminate all talk of logical classes such as S, M and P in favor of such circumlocutions as "The following schema turns out to be true no matter what words or phrases of the appropriate kind one may substitute for the letters S, M and P," etc., such descriptions avoid references to classes only by replacing them with equally nonphysical entities such as "all possible words, strings of letters, formalized languages," etc., and that the notion of truth or validity itself cannot be applied to physical objects or material inscriptions, but to what sentences mean or say, and the things they say are not physical. He rejects Quine's distinction that first order statements or arguments such as "All crows are black; all back things absorb light, therefore," etc., are logical truths, whereas "For all classes S, M and P, if all S is M and all M is P, then all S is P," are mathematical. This runs counter, he says, to the whole logical tradition. The natural intention of the logician in setting down first-order schemata is to assert implicitly their validity and that itself is a second-order assertion. All logic, therefore, including quantification theory, involves references to classes. This also highlights the difficulty of distinguishing between logic and mathematics in terms of first and second order logic, for if only the former is stipulated to be the proper domain of logic, then we must accept the awkward consequence that validity and implication turn out to be notions that belong to mathematics rather than logic. Since the nominalistic position presents the same problems for mathematics as for logic, Putnam sees no point in trying to draw any sharp distinction between the two, which explains his initial broad interpretation of logic as including all of pure mathematics and also the title of the book. To avoid some of the classical objections to a realistic interpretation of sets, he points up the distinction between a predicative and impredicative conception of set. Whereas the latter speaks of all sets of individuals as a well-defined totality, the former defines "set" only for a particular language N or a hierarchic series of languages, N, N', N", etc. in which it is still nonsensical to speak of "all sets" without qualification, though one can speak of "all" up to any given level in the series. While some form of set theory is necessary for all the sciences, both formal and physical, one can get along with predicative set theory. Putnam's basic argument for realism then comes down to this. Quantification over mathematical entities such as things, real numbers and functions is indispensable for logic, mathematics and the physical sciences and this commits one to accept the existence of such entities. In the final stages of the argument he examines and rejects the alternative options to realism, namely that realistic locutions about such entities represent logically deviant forms of speech, or that mathematical truths are "true by pure convention" or that such "entities" are useful fictions. In the closing paragraphs he indicates two other philosophical problems in logic that merit extensive discussion, namely the problem of equivalent constructions which is relevant to the question of whether mathematics needs "foundations" and the problem of whether we may not have to revise logical principles as we have geometrical ones on the grounds that in some sense logic may have empirical foundations.--A. B. W. (shrink)

As the subtitle and consecutive division of contents indicate, these two volumes are integral parts of a single work and one may wonder why they were not published as such since the indices and bibliography in the second volume refers to both works. The basic tripartite thesis of the combined volumes may be stated thus. Both universal properties and universal relationships exist independently of the classifying mind, but not in factual independence of particulars; what universals in fact exist, however, must (...) be determined not a priori by considering what predicates are applied to particulars by linguistic convention, but a posteriori according to the norms of an empiricistic epistemology. Hence, Armstrong calls his theory "a posteriori," or simply, "scientific realism," since it is the task of total science, conceived of as a total inquiry, to determine which monadic or polyadic predicates do correspond to universals and which do not. The first volume is essentially a critical appraisal of classical approaches to the nominalism-realism controversy, whereas the second is a more positive presentation of the author’s own theory and grows out of the prior critique. Thus the second volume can be read independently of the first, especially since a brief recapitulation of the argument of volume one is given at its beginning. Similarly, a brief summary of the argument of volume two is appended to volume one. Thus the two volumes, which apparently grew out of materials presented in independent, but related, seminars, could still be used as such. Only this and the possibility of a student buying the overly expensive work by parts seems to justify the peculiar way in which this set was published. (shrink)

Introduction: The decision of “do not attempt resuscitation” in the event of cardiopulmonary arrest is usually made when the patients are critically ill and cannot make an informed choice. Although, various professional bodies have published guidelines, little is know about the patients’ own views regarding DNAR discussion.Aim: The aim of this study was to determine patients’ attitudes regarding discussing DNAR before they are critically ill.Methods: A prospective study was performed in a general out patients department. A questionnaire was distributed to (...) consecutive outpatients along with an explanatory leaflet in the adult outpatient clinic.Results: 364 patients completed the questionnaire . 90% of respondents wanted all patients to be asked regarding DNAR decision at some point during a hospital admission. The majority would not find a DNAR discussion distressing. Only 10% would find it upsetting, however, 48% of these still wanted a discussion. 37% of respondents wanted to discuss DNAR decisions on admission; 32% in outpatients; 17% at consent for surgery, 14% when they are critically ill. 87% of respondents would not object to their relatives being involved in making decisions about their resuscitation status. However, only 12% of the subjects in the study had been involved in discussing the resuscitation status of a relative and 21% would not be comfortable to discuss a relative’s resuscitation status. Although 33% of patients preferred their resuscitation status to simply be documented within their clinical notes, 77% wanted it to be more easily accessible.Conclusions: This study suggests that contrary to current practice most patients want to discuss their DNAR status prior to becoming critically ill. This includes half of the small number that find it distressing to discuss. Although most patients are comfortable with relatives being involved in discussing DNAR, a significant proportion do not want their relatives to be asked. Furthermore, once a decision has been made, the majority of patients want it to be more accessible than current practice allows. (shrink)

Medieval scholars will welcome these two latest volumes in the splendid critical edition of the nonpolitical works of William of Ockham by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University. The first completes the set of Ockham’s major logical works that began with the publication of his monumental summa logicae in 1974 and was followed in 1978 by the second volume in the philosophical series, containing the commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle’s Praedicamenta and Perihermenias, together with the famous tract on predestination (...) and God’s knowledge of future contingents. Known as the Expositio aurea super artem veterem, this second collection was still available in modern photo-reprints of earlier editions, but the Expositio super libros elenchorum, unlike the popular Summa logicae, was never printed before and this last of Ockham’s commentaries on Aristotle’s logical Organon appears here for the first time in other than manuscript form. Though less important than the other commentaries Ockham did on Aristotle at the Franciscan study house in London during the interim between his completion of the lectures on the Sentences and his summons to the papal court at Avignon in 1324, this work, which antedates his commentaries on the Physics, is not without interest. It illustrates, for instance, how Ockham understood "science" and the subject thereof, to say nothing of the light it throws on how he interpreted the various classical fallacies listed by Aristotle to which he continually refers throughout his other writings. Like the other volumes of this edition, this also contains an excellent analytic index that might well serve as a model for improving other critical editions of medieval works as research tools. (shrink)

This is a major work by one of the best-known philosophical writers, representing the culmination of some twenty-five years’ work on the possibility of giving a rational defence of the claims of the religious man, and specifically the theist, in the face of modern criticisms. Dr Ewing’s object has been to fulfil what seem to him the two most important tasks for the philosopher in at least the present age, namely, to see if it is still possible to give (...) a rational defence of a genuinely religious point of view, and to do the same thing for an objective ethics, a task he has attempted in other works, and continues here. The conclusions are that while there can be no question of strict, logical proof, an ethical theism can be defended rationally as an explanatory, metaphysical hypothesis and there are no grounds to reject as illusory the most fundamental intuitive convictions of religion. The book, originally published in 1973, included a new theory of the ultimate criterion of truth for hypotheses, a restatement of the case for a substantial self and for indeterminism, a fresh treatment of the moral and certain other arguments for God, some points in the discussion of the problem of evil and some speculations on time. (shrink)

"The largest Ebola outbreak to date—first detected in December 2013 and still ongoing as of April 2015—has cast new light on the shortfalls of international public health systems.1 As in previous health crises, scrutiny has reemerged over the pharmaceutical industry’s ability and willingness to innovate new medicines for underserved disease areas. The public debate has intensified following revelations that promising drug candidates to treat Ebola had gone undeveloped despite compelling preclinical results.2 This lack of development is especially troubling because (...) it occurred after a recently implemented U.S. incentive scheme—the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) tropical disease priority review voucher program—designed to counteract exactly this problem. Taking Ebola as a case in point, it is useful to examine the short history and ongoing refinement of this voucher program, since it represents one of the most significant legislative efforts to systematically address the relative absence of com- mercial rewards for drugs targeting tropical diseases. This analysis evaluates the voucher program’s effectiveness for both stimulating private sector innovation and achieving positive health impacts among populations most severely burdened by tropical diseases. It then proposes specific recommendations for how law- makers can improve the program’s legislation to better achieve these objectives. ". (shrink)

Philosophers of science don't very often discuss the place of mathematics between other sciences or the meaning of mathematics for other sciences. They consider mathematics as a formal language with mainly analytical statements about the use of symbols (Carnap, Russell, Ayer ). Originally Wittgenstein defended this formalistic interpretation of mathematics in his TLP. Gradually, however, he develops himself towards an intuitionistic and ontological position, in which mathematics is conceived as the central and therefore normative part of our thought (of course (...) : on what there is and how it is). Mathematical science plays the role of logic in relation to other sciences. Its universal applicability and efficiency are consequences of its creating beings on a necessary level, in virtue of the number of its relations (always still by substitution). This highly important philosophy of mathematics (misinterpreted by Crispin Wright) starts with his lectures in Cambridge (in the thirties ) and reaches its culmination in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and in On Certainty. In a second part this philosophical determination of mathematical reasoning is traced backwards through history. David Hume's contribution is reinterpreted from a new point of view. Inside the total field of our beliefs he distinguishes between different sciences with the critérium of the intricacy of relations between items of our knowledge field. The more and stronger these relations, the more forceful and necessary their influence on the remaining parts of the system of our belief. So mathematics is in the centre, the loose reveries of our fancy on the periphery. Quine's representation of ‘the tribunal of sense experience’, by which the total field should be judged and corrected, must be disqualified. Hume's dictum ‘Whatever we conceive, we conceive it to be existent’ reveals sharply that this evaluative and corrective role is performed by the necessary thoughts (or, if one likes it so, ‘realities’) of mathematical science. That reason and especially mathematical reason is the highest judge on the population and structure of our world and a very precious heritage of Pythagorism and Platonism. From the sources of Sextus Empiricus and Aristotle the author tries to reconstruct exactly the original assertion of Pythagoristic mathematical philosophy, which has nothing to do with a naive hypostazation of numbers or a kabbalistic number mysticism. Philolaos' saying, that some propositions are stronger than we, is demonstrated to refer to mathematical laws. The pythagorical position is fully integrated in Plato's dialectical philosophy. Mathematics is the great mediator towards the intuition of true being, the ‘metaxu’ between sensible phenomena and ideas. This tradition of philosophical taxation of mathematics as the ‘logic of science’ is broken by Aristotle, who didn't use mathematics in his qualitative natural science and considered mathematics as an abstract science (about the quantitative aspect of being). Moreover, he disowned its logical role and created a special science for this task. Human reason is mathematical in so far it is sure of its language and thought, which is excellently expressed by the Greek μαθηματιxα (= what can be understood, learned and taught) and by the Dutch word ‘wiskunde’ (= science of what is certain). The remarks and reflections of Wittgenstein have produced a new perspective on the placevalue (‘Stellenwert’) of mathematics among all possible sciences and beliefs and have proven that its onto-logical purport is an unavoidable implication. (shrink)

An accurate analysis of the text shows that the small treatises have a logical structure and a style which is in all aspects unspinozistic. The main points of difference are : a formalistic interpretation of mathematics‚ the opposition between mathematics and physics‚ slavish cartesianism‚ the presence of numerous pleonasms‚ carelessness of expression‚ parade of learning‚ prolixity‚ attention for irrelevant qualities of authors quoted‚ educational purpose. Together with De Vet’s demonstration that the author of SRR and RK is still alive (...) in 1693 (see Tijdschr. v. Filosofie 45‚ 1983) these arguments force us‚ to consign Spinoza’s authorship‚ recently still defended by Petry a.o.‚ to the realm of fancy. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study the resources available and resources needed for ethics teaching to medical students in UK medical schools as required by the new GMC core curriculum. DESIGN: A structured questionnaire was piloted and then circulated to deans of medical schools. SETTING: All UK medical schools. RESULTS: Eighteen out of 28 schools completed the questionnaire, the remainder either indicating that their arrangements were "under review" (4) or not responding (6). Among those responding: 1) library resources, including video and information technology (...) were found to be fairly well developed; 2) many schools had a good supply of handouts and sample cases for teaching; 3) most had a written syllabus, and 4) two-thirds examined in the subject. However, many schools indicated that there was an urgent need for: 1) full-time teachers (most ethics teaching is still by part-time and voluntary staff); funding for books and journals, and 3) additional teaching materials (including further case vignettes, handouts and sample exam questions). CONCLUSIONS: There has been a considerable overall improvement in resources for medical ethics teaching since the time of the last national survey (The Pond Report). However, provision varies widely from medical school to medical school. The particular needs identified were for full-time teachers, library resources and teaching materials. Wider use of existing organisations concerned with medical ethics could help to meet these needs. (shrink)

In a recent re-assessment of the medical aspects of the Plague of Athens which is, to date, the most scholarly and comprehensive, Poole and Holladay have emphasized the tendency of many infectious diseases markedly to decline in virulence over decades and centuries and, sometimes, significantly to change their clinical manifestations. In the light of modern medicine they consider four possibilities: The Plague was a disease which still exists today. This they regard as improbable, It still exists in some (...) remote place or places unknown to medical science. This is discussed and dismissed, It became extinct, It was caused by an agent which nowadays causes a significantly different clinical syndrome. They conclude as follows: ‘The truth, we suggest, almost certainly lies in possibility or . But we can see no way of choosing between them. On either view the question: “What was the Athenian Plague?” is in principle unanswerable if the questioner is wanting to attach to the Plagsie the name of some modern disease or diseases’. (shrink)

Cortical color blindness, or cerebral achromatopsia, has been likened by some authors to ''blindsight'' for color or an instance of ''covert'' processing of color. Recently, it has been shown that, although such patients are unable to identify or discriminate hue differences, they nevertheless show a striking ability to process wavelength differences, which can result in preserved sensitivity to chromatic contrast and motion in equiluminant displays. Moreover, visually evoked cortical potentials can still be elicited in response to chromatic stimuli. We (...) suggest that these demonstrations reveal intact residual processes rather than the operation of covert processes, where proficient performance is accompanied by a denial of phenomenal awareness. We sought evidence for such covert processes by conducting appropriate tests on achromatopsic subject M.S. An ''indirect'' test entailing measurement of reaction times for letter identification failed to reveal covert color processes. In contrast, in a forced choice oddity task for color, M.S. was unable to verbally indicate the position of the different color, but was surprisingly adept at making an appropriate eye movement to its location. This ''direct'' test thus revealed the possible covert use of chromatic differences. (shrink)

In this introductory paper, we assess the current status of blindsight -- the phenomenon in which patients with damage to their primary visual cortex retain the ability to detect, discriminate and localize visual stimuli presented in areas of their visual field in which they report that they are subjectively blind. Blindsight has garnered a great deal of interest and critical research, in part because of its important implications for the philosophy of mind. We briefly consider why this is so, and (...) then go on to examine three empirical questions which have fuelled challenges to the validity of blindsight as a distinct neuropsychological phenomenon. First, is blindsight simply degraded normal vision? Second, does blindsight depend on undamaged areas of primary visual cortex? Third, does evidence that blindsight patients are aware of moving stimuli undermine the apparent dissociation between access to visual information and visual experience in blindsight? In the course of the review we introduce the four other papers on blindsight in this issue. We conclude that, although patients with primary visual cortex damage may indeed perceive moving stimuli, there is still good evidence for a dissociation between access to information and phenomenal experience which cannot be accounted for in terms of degraded normal vision or undamaged primary visual cortex. (shrink)

Pelikan argues, in this little book dealing with Luther's understanding of the Church, that the Reformer developed a reliance on some sort of "structure for the Spirit." The early Luther must be distinguished from the later Luther in terms of the conception of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the institutional structures of the Church. The radical Reformer in the 1520s came announcing "the counsel I have learned under the Spirit's guidance"; but by the 1530s he was searching for (...) some sort of ecclesiastical certainty: "this is the reason why our theology is certain; it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves." Pelikan adds still another insight to the massive literature on Luther. And his insights are usually profound. Luther is of two minds regarding institutions; on the one hand, the younger Luther can only reject those structures of the Roman Church: monasticism, the papacy. The older Luther knew from personal introspection and self-examination that those structures of the Church through which the unmerited goodness of God was communicated were means of grace. What seems to underline Pelikan's analysis of Luther is his reading of contemporary sociology of religion which makes the claim that all religious organizations develop greater and more severe institutional structures as time goes by. Weber and Troeltsch helped us with that observation a long time ago. It is good to have Pelikan do it again and to do it in connection with a thorough reading of Luther. One of the most helpful chapters in the book deals with Luther's conception of the Eucharist.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This is a surprisingly good book. Published by Longmans in Great Britain as part of a series on "Education Today," it provides a very lucid and cogent first glimpse at the discipline of the philosophy of religion. The author's perspective is derivative of the analytic school, but what makes the book so valuable is that Goodall relates linguistic distinctions to Biblical categories. The author makes it obvious that he is a believer and authenticates the conviction that one can be a (...) believer and still sound like Flew or Ryle. The influence of Ian T. Ramsey comes through loud and clear. Goodall presents his proofs for the validity of religious statements with clarity and vigor. Worth the price of the book alone is Goodall's discussion of Lear's "The pobble who had no toes."--W. A. J. (shrink)

Context The attitudes of medical professionals towards physician assisted dying have been widely discussed. Less explored is the level of agreement among physicians on the possibility of ‘rational suicide’—a considered suicide act made by a sound mind and a precondition of assisted dying legislation. Objective To assess attitudes towards rational suicide in a representative sample of senior doctors in England and Wales. Methods A postal survey was conducted of 1000 consultants and general practitioners randomly selected from a commercially available database. (...) The main outcome of interest was level of agreement with a statement about rational suicide. Results The corrected participation rate was 50%; 363 questionnaires were analysed. Overall 72% of doctors agreed with the possibility of rational suicide, 17% disagreed, and 11% were neutral. Doctors who identified themselves as being more religious were more likely to disagree. Some doctors who disagreed with legalisation of physician assisted suicide nevertheless agreed with the concept of rational suicide. Conclusions Most senior doctors in England and Wales feel that rational suicide is possible. There was no association with specialty. Strong religious belief was associated with disagreement, although levels of agreement were still high in people reporting the strongest religious belief. Most doctors who were opposed to physician assisted suicide believed that rational suicide was possible, suggesting that some medical opposition is best explained by other factors such as concerns of assessment and protection of vulnerable patients. (shrink)

BackgroundExtremely violent events such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings form a severe risk for the health and wellbeing of affected individuals. In this study based on a public health monitor, we focus on the health impact of the Utrecht tram shooting, which took place in the morning of March 18th 2019. A lone gunman opened fire on passengers within a moving tram. Four people died, and six people were injured in this attack. The attack resulted in nationwide commotion and (...) drew much media attention. Aim of this study was to increase insight into the health effects for the survivors, and whether they received the needed care and support.MethodsSemi-structured interviews with accompanying questionnaires were conducted at six and 18 months post-attack. Overall, 21 survivors participated in the first series of interviews, 15 in the second series. Qualitative data were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis, quantitative data was only described because of the low sample size.ResultsAt both six and 18 months after the attack many survivors had been able to resume daily life, and most rated their overall health as good or excellent. At the same time, a substantial portion suffered from health problems such as posttraumatic stress symptoms and other complaints, and needed professional care. Furthermore, those in need did not always find their own way to appropriate care through the existing health system: half of the survivors still needed support in finding the right care 18 months later.ConclusionAlthough the design and implementation of this public health monitor were accompanied by multiple challenges, it was possible to track a portion of the survivors and gain insight in the considerable health burden of the attack. Also, it is clear in this study that the health impact of terrorism affects survivors in the long run and requires attention from health authorities and professionals, as survivors were not able to find the right care by themselves. (shrink)

Pelikan argues, in this little book dealing with Luther's understanding of the Church, that the Reformer developed a reliance on some sort of "structure for the Spirit." The early Luther must be distinguished from the later Luther in terms of the conception of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the institutional structures of the Church. The radical Reformer in the 1520s came announcing "the counsel I have learned under the Spirit's guidance"; but by the 1530s he was searching for (...) some sort of ecclesiastical certainty: "this is the reason why our theology is certain; it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves." Pelikan adds still another insight to the massive literature on Luther. And his insights are usually profound. Luther is of two minds regarding institutions; on the one hand, the younger Luther can only reject those structures of the Roman Church: monasticism, the papacy. The older Luther knew from personal introspection and self-examination that those structures of the Church through which the unmerited goodness of God was communicated were means of grace. What seems to underline Pelikan's analysis of Luther is his reading of contemporary sociology of religion which makes the claim that all religious organizations develop greater and more severe institutional structures as time goes by. Weber and Troeltsch helped us with that observation a long time ago. It is good to have Pelikan do it again and to do it in connection with a thorough reading of Luther. One of the most helpful chapters in the book deals with Luther's conception of the Eucharist.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This is an extremely helpful book, superbly edited by Professor Molina, whose earlier book Existentialism as Philosophy provided a helpful introduction to existentialism as a serious, systematic philosophy. Molina successfully avoids all temptations to exploit the faddish quality of existentialism. After all these years, even the most protected, sequestered, academic institutions have had their resident left-bank habitue. And so one could play about lightly with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, sell lots of books, sound serious, and leave still another generation impressed (...) with the shallow and the superficial. But Molina is at all times the scholar. He refuses to couch difficult concepts in popular terms. And the result is a weighty, but well-written companion volume to the earlier expository work, providing the reader with an interesting selection of primary sources in the philosophy of existentialism. The authors represented are Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, Tillich, Heidegger, Gendlin, and Merleau-Ponty. Each selection is prefaced by Molina's interpretation of the material, excellently written and philosophically sound. The book ought to be a standard text for courses in Existentialism.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This chapter presents an edited e-mail discussion based on the philosophical conversations at a conference held in Cologne, Germany, in December 2001. The discussion proceeds in three steps. First, the contributors discuss selected questions about their contributions, roughly following the sequence of the chapters in Part II of this book. Second, the contributors ask more general questions about Dewey, Pragmatism, and constructivism. Finally, the chapter ends with brief statements about why Dewey is still an indispensible thinker for them. As (...) they clarify their differences and seek common ground, they articulate concepts such as power, truth, relativism, inquiry, and democracy from Pragmatist and interactive constructivist vantage points, in ways designed to render the preceding essays even more accessible. In their views, the concluding discussion demonstrates both the enduring relevance of classical Pragmatism and the challenge of its reconstruction from the perspective of the Cologne program of interactive constructivism. (shrink)

The Birkhoff-Maltsev problem asks for a characterization of those lattices each of which is isomorphic to the lattice L(K) of all subquasivarieties for some quasivariety K of algebraic systems. The current status of this problem, which is still open, is discussed. Various unsolved questions that are related to the Birkhoff-Maltsev problem are also considered, including ones that stem from the theory of propositional logics.

Despite widespread agreement that it would be ethical to use somatic cell gene therapy to correct serious diseases, there is still uneasiness on the part of the public about this procedure. The basis for this concern lies less with the procedure's clinical risks than with fear that genetic engineering could lead to changes in human nature. Legitimate concerns about the potential for misuse of gene transfer technology justify drawing a moral line that includes corrective germline therapy but excludes enhancement (...) interventions in both somatic and germline contexts. Keywords: somatic cell, germ line, genetic diseases, genetic engineering, humanness, enhancement, eugenics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this article, we sketch a new approach to law and ethics. The traditional paradigm, exemplified in the debate on liberal moralism, becomes increasingly inadequate. Its basic assumptions are that there are clear moral norms of positive or critical morality, and that making statutory norms is an effective method to have citizens conform to those norms. However, for many ethical issues that are on the legislative agenda, e.g. with respect to bioethics and anti-discrimination law, the moral norms are controversial, vague (...) or still evolving. Moreover, law proves not to be a very effective instrument. Therefore, we need a new paradigm, both for descriptive and for normative analysis. This interactive paradigm, as a normative position, can be summarised in two theses. The process of legislation on ethical issues should be structured as a process of interaction between the legislature and society or relevant sectors of society, so that the development of new moral norms and the development of new legal norms may reinforce each other. And legislation on ethical issues should be designed in such a way that it is an effective form of communication which, moreover, facilitates an ongoing moral debate and an ongoing reflection on such issues, because this is the best method to ensure that the practice remains oriented to the ideals and values the law tries to realise. (shrink)

This paper is based on Lectures 1, 2 and 4 in the series of ten lectures titled “Algebraic Structures for Logic” that Professor Blok and I presented at the Twenty Third Holiday Mathematics Symposium held at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico, January 8-12, 1999. These three lectures presented a new approach to the algebraization of deductive systems, and after the symposium we made plans to publish a joint paper, to be written by Blok, further developing these (...) ideas. That project was still incomplete when Blok died. In fact, there is no indication that he had prepared a draft of the paper, and we do not know what new material he intended to include. I am therefore not in a position to complete the project as he had envisioned it. So, I have settled for the more limited objective of presenting the material from the three lectures, leaving to others the task of adapting the techniques used there to more general situations. (shrink)

William Abraham studied Philosophy at the University of Ghana, and even more Philosophy at Oxford University. Thereafter, he gained permission to take part in the competitive examination and interview for a fellowship at All Souls' College. The examination was once described, with some exaggeration, as 'the hardest exam in the world!' It included a three-hour essay. Following his success in becoming the first African fellow of All Souls, his interest in African politics quickly developed into a Pan-African perspective. The Mind (...) of Africa, written while he was still at All Souls, was a fruit of that enlarged perspective. After several years as a Fellow, he had occasion to visit Ghana in 1962. There Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, successfully persuaded him to return to Ghana to teach at the University of Ghana, Legon and he subsequently resigned from All Souls. In 1968, he went to the United States as a visiting professor. This was followed by invitations to teach at various academic institutions there, including Berkeley and Stanford. He subsequently settled in California, where he continued to teach and research philosophy in the University of California at Santa Cruz until his retirement. The Mind of Africa appeared at a time when a number of African countries were obtaining, or fighting for, their political freedom from their colonial rulers and becoming independent nations and expecting to build new societies in accordance with their own visions and conceptions, though not necessarily jettisoning all the features of their colonial heritage. Building new societies requires appropriate ideologies and philosophies fashioned within the crucible of their cultural and historical experiences. Thus, the relation between ideology and society is taken up at the very outset of the book... The Mind of Africa is important for Africa's future and identity. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: Cognitive and sensory difficulties frequently jeopardize informed consent of frail elderly patients This study is the first to test whether preliminary research experience could enhance geriatric patients' capacity to consent. DESIGN/SETTING: A step-wise consent procedure was introduced in a study on fluid balance in geriatric patients. Eligible patients providing verbal consent participated in a try-out of a week, during which bioelectrical impedance and weight measurements were performed daily. Afterwards, written informed consent was requested. Comprehension, risk and inconvenience scores (ranges: (...) 0-10) were obtained before and after the try-out by asking ten questions about the study's essentials and by asking for a risk and inconvenience assessment on a ten-points rating scale. SUBJECTS AND RESULTS: Seventy of the 78 eligible subjects started the try-out and 53 (68%) provided written consent. The comprehension score increased from 5.0 (+/- 2.3) to 7.0 (+/- 1.9) following the try-out (P < 0.001). The number of subjects capable of weighing risks and inconveniences increased from 32 to 48 (P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Research experience improved the capacity to consent, still enabling an acceptable participation rate. Therefore, experienced consent seems a promising tool to optimize informed consent in frail elderly subjects. (shrink)

In 1962 a mimeographed sheet of paper fell into my possession. It had been prepared by Ernest Adams of the Philosophy Department at Berkeley as a handout for a colloquim. Headed 'SOME FALLACIES OF FORMAL LOGIC' it simply listed eleven little pieces of reasoning, all in ordinary English, and all absurd. I still have the sheet, and quote a couple of the arguments here to give the idea. • If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will (...) start. There fore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or, if you throw switch T the motor will start. • It is not the case that if John passes history he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history. The disconcerting thing about these inferences is, of course, that under the customary truth-functional interpretation of and, or, not, and if-then, they are supposed to be valid. What, if anything, is wrong? At first I was not disturbed by the examples. Having at that time consider able personal commitment to rationality in general and formal logic in par ticular, I felt it my duty and found myself easily able (or so I thought) to explain away most of them. But on reflection I had to admit that my expla nations had an ad hoc character, varying suspiciously from example to example. (shrink)

Naturalism holds that there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses. Still it does not repudiate untestable hypotheses. They fill out interstices of theory and lead to further hypotheses that are testable.A hypothesis is tested by deducing, from it and a background of accepted theory, some observation categorical that does not follow from the background alone. This categorical, a generalized conditional compounded of two observation sentences, admits in turn of a primitive experimental test.The observation sentences themselves, (...) like ape cries and bird calls, are in holophrastic association with ranges of neural intake. Denotation of determinate objects figures neither in this association nor in deducing the categorical from the scientific hypotheses. Hence the indeterminacy of reference; ontology is purely auxiliary to the structure of theory. Truth, however, is seen still as transcendent at least in this sense: we say of a superseded scientific theory not that it ceased to be true, but that it is found to have been false. (shrink)

Our understanding of what microbes are and how they evolve has undergone many radical shifts since the late nineteenth century, when many still believed that bacteria could be spontaneously generated and most thought microbial “species” (if any) to be unstable and interchangeable in form and function (pleomorphic). By the late twentieth century, an ontology based on single cells and definable species with predictable properties, evolving like species of animals or plants, was widely accepted. Now, however, genomic and metagenomic data (...) show that lateral gene transfer compromises this picture of stability and predictability, and refocuses our attention on multilineage communities. Treating such communities as unstable but identifiable evolving “individuals” makes us again pleomorphists, of a sort. (shrink)

Between inventing the concept of a universal computer in 1936 and breaking the German Enigma code during World War II, Alan Turing, the British founder of computer science and artificial intelligence, came to Princeton University to study mathematical logic. Some of the greatest logicians in the world--including Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, John von Neumann, and Stephen Kleene--were at Princeton in the 1930s, and they were working on ideas that would lay the groundwork for what would become known as computer science. (...) Though less well known than his other work, Turing's 1938 Princeton PhD thesis, "Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals," which includes his notion of an oracle machine, has had a lasting influence on computer science and mathematics. This book presents a facsimile of the original typescript of the thesis along with essays by Andrew Appel and Solomon Feferman that explain its still-unfolding significance. A work of philosophy as well as mathematics, Turing's thesis envisions a practical goal--a logical system to formalize mathematical proofs so they can be checked mechanically. If every step of a theorem could be verified mechanically, the burden on intuition would be limited to the axioms. Turing's point, as Appel writes, is that "mathematical reasoning can be done, and should be done, in mechanizable formal logic." Turing's vision of "constructive systems of logic for practical use" has become reality: in the twenty-first century, automated "formal methods" are now routine. Presented here in its original form, this fascinating thesis is one of the key documents in the history of mathematics and computer science. (shrink)

Mario Bunge wrote his classic Causality and Modern Science more than 60 years ago, and a third revised edition was published by Dover in 1979. With its impressive scope and historical perspective it was a long way ahead of its time. But many of its insights still have not been sufficiently appreciated by physicists and philosophers alike. These include Bunge’s distinction between causation and other types of determination, his critique of the still-dominant Humean accounts of causality as leaving (...) out the productive aspect of determination, his critique of the conflation of determination with predictability, his insistence on the fictional character of isolated causal chains, and his demonstration that “causal connectability” depends only on the principle of retarded action, not causation. It will be argued that there is a degree of agreement between his views on determinism and causality and those of Leibniz, and a comparison between the two thinkers’ views is used to throw further light on these matters. (shrink)

How has political revolution figured into the development of avant-garde cultural production? Is the vanguard an antiquated concept or does its influence still resonate in the 21st century? Focusing closely on the convergence of aesthetics and politics that materialized in the early part of the twentieth century, this study offers a re-interpretation of the historical avant-garde from 1917 to 1962, a turbulent period in intellectual history which marked the apex, crisis, and decline of vanguardist authority. Moving from the impact (...) of the Bolshevik Revolution to the anti-imperialist and decolonizing movements in the Third World, to the emergence of neo-vanguardism in the wake of postmodernity, this study opens the way for understanding the transformation of vanguardist cultural paradigms from a global perspective, the implications of which also reveal its relevance and application to the contemporary period. (shrink)

Named for the famous Chinese minister of state, Guan Zhong, the Guanzi is one of the largest collections of ancient Chinese writings still in existence. With this volume, W. Allyn Rickett completes the first full translation of the Guanzi into English. This represents a truly monumental effort, as the Guanzi is a long and notoriously difficult work. It was compiled in its present form about 26 B.C. by the Han dynasty scholar Liu Xiang and the surviving text consists of (...) some seventy-six anonymous essays dating from the fifth century B.C. to the first century B.C.The forty-two chapters contained in this volume include several which present Daoist theories concerning self-cultivation and the relationship between the body and mind as well as the development of Huang-Lao political and economic thought. The "Dizi zhi" chapter provides one of the oldest discussions of education in China. The "Shui di" chapter refers to the circulation of blood some two thousand years before the discoveries of William Harvey in the West. Other chapters deal with various aspects of statecraft, Yin-Yang and Five Phases thought, folk beliefs, seasonal calendars, and farming. Perhaps the best-known chapters are those that deal with various methods of controlling and stimulating the economy. They constitute one of the world's earliest presentations of a quantity theory of money. Throughout the text, Rickett provides extensive notes. He also supplies an introduction to the volume and a comprehensive index. (shrink)